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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
cl?ST

tl/\TIONAL BANK OF COMMERCE,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
Case No. 19287

\1.

JEOFFREY MEACHAM,
Defendant-Appellant.

BRIEF OF PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an action originally brought by Plaintiff, First
National Bank of Commerce, for replevin.

On March 14, 1983,

after oral arguments on Plaintiff's Motion for Summary
Judgment, the Honorable Philip R. Fishler of the Third Judicial
District Court in and for Salt Lake County issued a Memorandum
Decision and granted Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment as
to its First Cause of Action.

The district court found that

tne Plaintiff had the immediate right to possession of the
subJect Ferrari automobile and that the transfer of the vehicle
the Defendant amounted to a conversion by the Defendant.
Tne

further found that the Defendant was not a bona fide

p1irchaser for value in21smuch 21s he f21iled to protect himself by
who held title to 21nd liens on the vehicle.

-2-

The issue of damages was reserved for future determination
by the trial

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Defendant-Respondent, First National Bank of Commerce,
requests that this Court affirm the trial court's judgment.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Appellant's statement of the facts is incomplete and
includes several allegations," fact,"
record.

unsupported by the

Therefore, Respondent provides the following

comprehensive statement of facts:
On May 23, 1979, Richard and Shawn Carey purchased a 1Q78
Ferrari 308 automobile bearing identification number 26897.
(R. 170)

On January 12, 1981, the Careys obtained a lo:rn fr<Jm

Plaintiff First National Bank of Commerce (hereinafter "Bank")
in.the amount of $32,686.92 secured by the subject Ferrari.
(R.

166)

On April 16, 1981, the state of Louisiana issued a

certificate of title showing Richard and Shawn Carey as owners
of the Ferrari automobile.

The Bank was shown as the first

lien holder in the amount of $32,686.92.

(R.

166-67, 170-711

On March 11, 1981, Dr. Beuker F. Amann, Jr.

(hereinafter

"Amann") purchased the Ferrari from Richard Carey for
$36,000.00.

(R.

161, 163)

To help finance the purchase, Amanr.

borrc)Wed $25 ,ODO. 00 fr,,m Plaintiff Bank t.,wards the purcha'<e
the car.

(R. 161, 167, 172-73)

This ClJntract c,·,ntained a
-3-

,i

o"'':llr tty

agreement placing a lien on the subject Ferrari in the

3m•.c1rt

$35,429.28.

(R. 167, 172-73)

On April 27, 1981,

Anann made the first payment due under his note and contract
,11t1.

.i,

li

due.

the Bank.
'Ji t

l ''"

On May 20, 1981, Amann defaulted on his

to the Bank by not making the second payment when

Amann did not make any further payments under the

c0ntract and note after April 27, 1981.

(R. 161, 167)

on May 27, 1981, Plaintiff Bank sent the following
documents to the Louisiana Department of Public Safety to
perfect its security interest:
( ll

Application for Certificate of Title;

(2)

Notarized Bill of Sale;

(3)

Certificate of Title No. L2334105;

(4)

Notarized Chattel Mortgage;

(5)

Declaration of Insurance Statement;

(6)

Personal check for $2,534.00.

(R. 167, 174)

On or about June 10, 1981, the Department of Public Safety
requested additional items from the Bank in connection with
i3suing the Ferrari's title in Amann's name.

Specifically, the

Department of Public Safety requested that the rear of the
title ue signed by Richard and Shawn Carey and that a check for
penalty and interest be submitted in addition to the check
1r1ginally submitted.

(R. 167-68, 179)

On September 8, 1981,

the Bank received a reissued title from the Louisiana
Jepirtment of Motor Vehicles.

The Bank has retained possession

,f the title to the Ferrari at all times since.

-4-

( R. 168)

Contrary to Defendant's contention, there is no evidence
before this Court that the Bank's original lien, noted on the
Carey title, was ever released on the records of the Louisiana
Department of Moten Vehicles until September 8, 1981, when the
title was reissued.
According to Defendant Jeof frey A. Meacham, he and Richarrl
Carey discussed Meacham's purchase of the Ferrari in June, 1981
The agreed purchase price was $5,000.00 cash and 7,000 shares
of U.S. Rich Hill Minerals Corporation.
Meacham, pp.

10, 15)

(R. 291; deposition of

During that same month Amann deliverPrl

the Ferrari to Mr. Carey at Mr. Amann's home in New Orleans,
Louisiana, for the purpose of having r1r. Carey sell the car
Meacham.

(R. 162)

The car was subsequently delivered to

Meacham in Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, at which time Meacham was
shown a vehicle registration card which showed Shawn Carey,
wife of Richard Carey, as the owner.

Mr. Carey did not give

title to the Ferrari to Defendant at that time; Moreover,
Defendant has never received title to the automobile.
291; deposition of Meacham, pp. 10-11, 16)

(R.

Meacham transp,-;rted

the Ferrari to Salt Lake City soon thereafter.

( R.

291;

deposition of Meacham p. 17)
soon after Meacham arrived in Salt Lake City with the car,
both the Bank and Amann contacted Meacham concerning the statu,
of the Ferrari.

Amann stated that the car belonged ta him and

that the Plaintiff had a lien on it.
Meacham, pp. 6-7)

(R. 291; deposition of

Meacham was also informed of Plaintiff's
-5-

l10n througn a personal conversation with Plaintiff.

( R.

291;

of Mea:ham, pp. 26-27).
Pla.intiff and Meacham made an agreement whereby Meacham
e;qu:ed tc) pay ,.:iff Plaintiff's lien in return for title to the
oiutufTil)lille.

(R. 291; depositi.:in of Meacham, pp. 26-30)

on

July 20, 1981, Plaintiff sent a customer's draft to Defendant's
ba.nk in Salt Lake City.

(R. 98)

Also, on July 20, 1981,

Meacham made his first and only payment on the automobile by
w1r1ng $5,000.00 to Amann's Account in the a.ccount of Amann.
Account No. 30-03515, in the First City Bank of Westheimer,
Huust·Jn, 'l:'exas.

(R.

68, 71)

After at least one more attempt to have Defendant either
return the car or satisfy the lien, this action was filed by
the Bank to regain its rightful possession to the automobile.
Meacham has neither satisfied the Bank's lien on, nor paid for,
the subject automobile.

ARGUMENT
POINT I
Defendant Meacham converted the Ferrari.
A.

Murdock v. Blake controls the subject action.

As recognized by the district court, the controlling issue
w1tn

to determining the owner of the automobile is

:,,nversion,

On March 11, 1981, Amann borrowed $25,000.00 from

0

li1nt1ff Bank and signed a promissory note and security

oyrecrncnt whereby Amann gave Plaintiff Bank a security interest
-6-

in the subject automobile.

(R. 172-173)

The fifth p:iragnph

on the reverse side of this contract states:

"If borrower

fails to make any scheduled payment or defaults in any other
obligation under this contract, holder may cause the mortgagPd
vehicle to be seized and sold under executory or any other
legal process, in the manner provided by law.
Further, Utah law provides that unless otherwise agreed, "a
secured party has on default the right to take possession of
the collateral.

§

70A-9-503, Utah Code Ann. (Repl. VJ!.

1977) .
Amann made his first and only payment to the Bank on April
27, 1981.

He made no further payments.

Thus, on May 21, 1981,

the day after the second payment was due, Amann defaulted on
his loan.

The Bank, as the secured party, was, therefore,

entitled to possession of the automobile after May 20, 1981.
Once Amann breached his contract, his right to possess or sell
the vehicle terminated.
In Murdock v. Blake, 26 Utah 2d 22, 484 P.2d 164 (1971),
this Court faced a factual situation similar to the current
case.

Murdock v. Blake involved a lien creditor's execution

upon property held subject to a security interest.

The debt.Jr,

Blake, had defaulted on an agreement with Atlantic Richfield,
the secured creditor.

After Blake's default under his security

agreement with Atlantic Richfield, Murdock, a lien creditor,
received a default judgment against Blake (in a matter
unrelated to the Atlantic Richfield matter) and executed on th'
-7-

property secured by Atlantic Richfield's security interest.
The Court held:
Plake was in default at the time plaintiffs received
the default j1dgment, Atlantic was entitled to possession
"t ttie collateral at that time, both by virtue of the
express provisions of the security agreement and by section
70A-9-503.
In other words, the right to possession and
sale of the collateral passed from the debtor, Blake, to
the secured party, Atlantic, at the time of default, and
these are the rights to which Atlantic was entitled to be
restored.
Murdock, 484 P.2d at 169.
The Court continued:
The most important remedy available to a secured party is
the right to take possession of the collateral following a
debtor's default. After default, the debtor has lost his
right of possession and sale and retains only a contingent
right in the surplus, if any, after sale.

* * *
One who has possession or an immediate right to possession,
such as a chattel mortgagee or conditional seller after
default, may maintain an action for conversion against one
who has exercised unauthorized acts of dominion over the
property of another in exclusion or denial of his rights or
inconsistent therewith.
Murdock, 484 P.2d at 169.
Contrary to appellant's urgings, perfection of the secured
party's interest is not a necessary element in the conversion
action.

The status of the secured party (by virtue of the

Security Agreement), not perfection, governs the outcome of the
Murdock vs. Blake line of cases.

The mention of perfection in

11urdc)ck vs. Blake and other cases cited by appellant is mere
ciJ.cta in the recitation of Licts introducing the opinion.

At

ttie time of default the only priority issue in Mqrdock and the
-urrent case arises between the secured party and the debtor.
Iri su'-'n a posture perfection is meaningless.

-8-

On May 20, 1981, upon Amann' s df'f au 1 t, thP bank had
right to possession of the automobile.

tieacham didn't rPcPiv.-

the car from Carey until 0ver one montn later;

and he didn't

make his one and only payment on the car until July 20, 1981,
two full months after the bank received full p0ssess0ry rign•c
The issue of priority between a secured party and a
subsequent purchaser, so heavily reliPd on by appellant is,
therefore, completely immaterial.

At the date of Amann's

default under the loan with the bank, the bank shifted fr,Jm u,"
position of a party with a mere security interest to that of
party with full possessory rights.

1

The ruling in tiurdock vs.

makes it clear that in Utah the issues of perfection and
priority under the commercial code are no longer relevan• Jnc•
a secured party obtains possessory rights.

Meacham's

unauthorized control over the automobile which the bank, and
only the bank, had the right to possess is conversion.
B.
The Bank had the immediate right to possession of •he
automobile upon the debtor's default.
Defendant Meacham now argues that Plaintiff was not
entitled to immediate possession of the automobile upon the
default
Law.

Jf Amann

the Louisiana Executory PrJcePdinq

Defendant argues that the right of p0ssession under

Louisiana law accrues Jnly after a credit'H has gc,ne thr,-.ugh
executory proceeding.
In his answer to Plaintiff's Jrig1nal and amended
complaints, Defendant uffered general denials to Plaintiff'•

-'l-

J'

J

l

't

J

•ll

t_ •

IR. 51-53, 218-220A)

Jr,L1sning this.

"eacham offered no affidavits

And this defense is not mentioned in

.,, IJ"t' s Memorandum in Opposition to Summary Judgment.
I

'

..:

(R.

(.I ,_' )

In fact, Defendant agreed in his Supplemental Memorandum in
•,rp,3it1on to Summary Judgment that Section 70A-9-503 of the
Utan Cude Annotated "granted to the secured party the right to
take possession of the collateral as to the debtor" (R. 230),
but argued that the rights of third parties were to be
determined based on the issue of perfection.
It is well established that Defendant cannot now raise a
new deEense that was not before the trial court.

sute, 640 P. 2d 1044 (Utah, 1981).

Yost v.

Under Rule 56, Utah Rules

jf C1v1l Procedure, Defendant's general denials are not
sufficient to establish the defense that Plaintiff did not have
tne immediate right to possession.

Rule 56(e) states in part:

\/hen a motion for summary judgment is made and supported as
provided in this rule, an adverse party may not rest upon
tne mere allegations or denials of his pleading, but his
response, by affidavits or otherwise provided in this rule,
must set forth specific facts showing there is a genuine
issue for trial.
Clearly, the issue of Plaintiff's immediate right of
)3'c331on was not raised in the trial court; defendant cannot
raise this defense on appeal.
:luntnel0ss, even under Louisiana law, plaintiff has the
1°1rot '·, lf'lmed1ate possessi,.rn of the CcJllateral upon the
c,cl t

,ut,rj

cl"fault.

The Louisiana statutes dealing with

[Jf.,cess, La. Rev. Stat. Ann. §9:5363 and La. Civ.

Code Ann. Articles 2631 -

2639, requir"s Ui3t beL:,r0 a part)'

can seize and sell coll:iteral, he must file a ['•'titian with.,
court setting forth evidence of the ·)bl iqat i·rn, c·)nfessi·Jn cf
Judgment, and the Plaintiff's right to use executory proces;
The court then issues a writ of seizure and sale.

as

If,

in

this case, the debtor waives notice and demand in the origina,
instrument or in any other writing, the

need not bP

notified of the proceeding or receive demand f-,r payment
the coilateral is seized.

The executory prJceeding under

Louisiana law may be completely ex parte.

The filing of th•

petition does not establish the secured party's right to go
against the collateral; rather it merely sets forth a Judical:
enforced procedure for taking possession of personal propert;.
Simply stated, Louisiana is not a "self help" state.

This

distinction, h0wever, does ncJt affect the bank's right LJ
possession upon Amann's default.

Even in a UCC state, such a;

Utah, the right to immediate possessicJn of the security upon a
debtor's default remains unaffected if the secured party eleccc
to repossess the security through Judicial process ratner thar
through self help.

Utah Code Annotated,

70A-9-50l and

§§

70A-9-503 (Replacement Volume 1980).
Under either Utah or Louisiana law, as well as under th•
terms of the contract, plaintiff was entitled

immediate

t

possession of the Ferrari upon Amann's ·Jefault.
t CJ o k

po s s e 3 s i

0

n

f

the

possessory right.
converted tne Ferrari.

:l

ut

i l

i

n

'/

i

_,

l

J

t

i

_,

n

Meacham thcr,
,_-) f

t n.::

l) 3 n k '

'3

POINT II
,, 3 ,,

PJJ1ntiff's security interest was perfected under Louisiana
j1v1 cherefore its rights are superior to Defendant's.
A.

Under Louisiana Law, Plaintiff's security interest was

P'" f,ccted.

In the memorandum decision of the trial court, the
Hon0rable Judge Fishler granted summary judgment based on his
E indings

that ( l) Defendant converted the vehicle; and ( 2) that

Defendant was not a bona fide purchaser.

In passing, Judge

F1snl€r also stated that Plaintiff's interest was unperfected
at the time of the sale, but that Plaintiff's interest was
;ttll superiur to Defendant's because Defendant was not a bona
fide purchaser.

Judge Fishler's statement regarding perfection

was not essential to his decision, the decision was not based
on perfection, and therefore the statement is dictum and not
binding.

Plaintiff will therefore briefly consider this issue

Jf perfection.

Appellant is correct in asserting that the determination of
of Plaintiff's security interest is governed by the
law of the State of Louisiana.

Utah Code Annotated, section

"70A-9-l03(2)(b)(Repl. vol., 1977)

Section 32:710 of

Vehicle Certificate of Title Law is the applicable
law in determining the effect of perfection with regard to the
3ank's security interest.

To obtain priority against third

,-,,ro:; ,ns, SE>ction 32:710(8) requires that every chattel mortgage
1

in

duly authenticated.
-12-

Section 32:710(8) further

provides that the chattel mortg3ge sh3ll he 0ffective 3s toll.
persons from the date such chattel mortg3ge is delivered to tt
commissioner; anc the .s3me sh3ll lie su,'<'ri.,r in r3nk

V:;

3 n:;

privilege or preference 3rising sub.sequently thereto.
In the case of H3rper v. Borclen C·.-:;mp3nv, 129 s,·,. 2d 330,
336 (Louisiana, 1961), the Louisi3n3 court held th3t the
requirements of Section 32:710 3re "intended mer<'ly to insure
an accur3te description of the vehicle so it c3n be
identified."

The Bank's ret3il inst3llment contr3ct included

the year, make, series model number, body type and seri3l
number, cert3inly enought inform3tion to s3tisfy Section
32:710.

( R.

172)

The evidence before this Court est3b 1 i shes th3t .;n r•ay ?7,
1981, the Bank sent the following documents to the Louisi3nJ
Department of Public Safety:
(1)

Application for Certificate of Title;

(2)

tlot3rized Bill .A

(3)

Certificate of Title No. L2334105;

(4)

Notarized Ch3ttel Mortgage;

(5)

Declaration of Insurance St3tement; and

(6)

Person3l check for $2,534.00.

Sal.c;

There is no question th3t the Bank delivered the ch3ttel
mortg3ge to the Louisian3 Dep3rtment of M··,t·.>r If.chicles •'ln May
27, 1981.

(R.

Depa r t men t

,., f

dated May 27,

167).

The Bank's c0ver

M·:; t ·::>r Ve h i c 1e s \Ii t h tl'H'
1981 (R.

174); 3nd

letter t·-:; the Lc,uisian.3

t " 3 c r: ,. 'i ch · r t cp g" i

•n June 10,

- 1 ., -

1981, the

Df Public Safety sent a note to the Bank
receipt of the documents, including the chattle
'! ''JE:,

,,, .r

'1nd requesting additional Lix and the signatures of

'-''"' cHeys on their title.

(R. 179)

The lien was perfected, therefore, on May 27, 1981, or soon
t11erea ft er, and certainly no later than June 10, 1981.

section

32:7l0(BI expressly states that the chattel mortgage is
effective against all persons from the date such chattel
mortgage is delivered to the commissioner; nowhere in the
code does the chattel mortgage's effectiveness rest
.n the commissioner's validation or final acceptance.
AfJpellant cites Section 70A-9-302, Utah Code Ann.

(Repl.

1977 I, as providing a useful analogy in considering the
proper fJrm of a chattel mortgage creating a valid security
interest.

According to Appellant, "a financing statement

substantially complying with the (filing provisions) is
effective even though it contains minor errors which are not
seriously misleading."

9-302(9).

Respondent fully agrees.

Bank fully complied with the filing requirements under the
LJuisiana Vehicle Certificate of Title Law with respect to the
chattle mortgage.

Admittedly the Bank neglected to obtain the

,riy1nal owner's signature on the original title; and the check
a penalty and interest.

But Louisiana Law does not

require such items to make a chattle mortgage
tf

0

crive and such omissions certainly cannot be considered

, :.er t»usly misleading. n

-14-

Finally, Appellant argues that since the Amann
was returned to the Plaintiff because the C:Heys' title had

M'

been signed, and because the Carey title was still an the
records, third pecsons could be misled as ta the ownership of
the vehicle.

Furthermore, Defendant notes that sometime after

taking possession of the automobile, he inquired of the record,
and found that the records showed Carey as the owner of the
subject automobile.

(R.

291; deposition of Meacham, p. 37)

It

should make no difference to Defendant whether the records of
the Louisiana Department of Motor Vehicles showed Carey as the
title owner or Amann as the title owner.

Both titles show

Plaintiff as having a first lien on the vehicle.
180)

(R.

170,

From April 16, 1981, forward, the records (;f Louisiana

showed Plaintiff as holding a lien on the automobile.
Defendant did not, at the time of taking possession of the
vehicle, make the effort to determine whether there were any
liens at all on the vehicle.

Defendant knew before making any

payment that Plaintiff had a lien on the vehicle and therefore
Defendant cannot now claim that Defendant's interest is
superior to Plaintiff's.
Finally, it should be noted that Defendant, in an eff.:)[t •:
lead the Court to believe that there is an issue of fact
remaining,

is intentionally presenting his ,-;wn sL1tements as i'.

they are "facts" in the record.

Defendant provided n'

affidavits supporting his claims that Plaintiff's perfection
the chattel mortgage was defective; that the sale of the
-15-

,uL1m0bile by Carey to Amann took place on a date other than
i1Hr:n LL, 1981; or that Charles Pisano was an in-house notary
dHntiff.

·t
tt,Jc

,f

A1d there is nothing in the record to establish

Plaintiff did not resubmit the application for certificate

title before Defendant took possession of the car or before

me first payment by Defendant was made on July 20, 1981.

These facts have not been and cannot now be at issue.
B.
CuUrt,

Texas law is inapplicable to any issue before this

Appellant invested many pages arguing that Texas law should
be

applied to determine the priority of the parties' interest.

Apparently, Appellant believes that the Ferrari was removed by
Amann from Louisiana to Texas; that Plaintiff Bank knew or

sr, . ,uld nave known of the removal; and that Texas law should be
3pplied to determine the priorities of the parties.

Appellant

cloims bases these hereto unalleged claims on a Transaction
History Card (R. 82) showing an Amann address in Houston four
months after Defendant took possession of the car.

Defendant

submitted no affidavits alleging that the subject automobile
was taken to or kept by Amann in Texas.

In fact, the chattel

mortgage for the purchase of the automobile by Amann was signed
in

Luuisiana.

Amann declared in the chattel mortgage that the

would be kept at 145 Robert E. Lee Street, New Orleans,
L.1u1 '1an3.

(R.

172-73)

Moreover,

Mr.

Amann, in his Affidavit

Jated October 15, 1982, declared that on June 21, 1981, he
·'diver0cJ the Ferrari to
lear1s, Louisiana.

(R.

nr.

Carey at his (Amann's) home in New

161-62)

-16-

By affidavit, the Respondent

tds

0

sta[1li

shecl

car was purchased and financed in LGuisiana;
:>greed to keep the c3r in Louisi3na;

I 3)

t_hat ( l) tho

I 2) that Amann

3nJ that ,,n Jun0 21,

1981, Carey picked up the c3r 3t Amann's hom0

in Louisiana.

Again, f,::ir the first time, Appell.mt is n,-.w trying ho f3br 1 ci•,
a new 3rgument baed on f:icts not previously before the Trial
Court 3nd not now before this Court.

7he only f3ct now

introduced by Meach3m is th:it fourt months after Me3ch3m's
conversion of the Ferroiri, 3 Tr:insacti,-,n Hist'.H'/ Card shows
address, not the 3ddress, for Amann in Houston.

ir

Th is is n')t

sufficient evidence to show that Am3nn lived in or the
automobile was kept in Houston, Texas.

POINT III

Defendant is not a Bona Fide Purchaser.
Appellant's fin:il contention is th:it Defend3nt Me:>ch3m wis
a bona fide purchaser for value and th3t his interest in the
automobile is therefore protected by Louisi:ina law.

Defend int

claims that he purchased the Ferrari from Rich:ird C:irey in thE
latter part of June, 1981, :ind th:>t it w3s n,_,t until after r,e
h3d wired $5,000.00 to Mr. C3rey th3t he heard that Mr.
did not

Care;

own the car and that the Bank had a lien on

the automc,bile.
on these claims, Defendant 3sserts that
purchaser with rights superior t,, th,,se

-17-

r1e

is a iJ,:.na fide

,f Pl1int1ff.

Even under this 3rgument, Defendant's claim fails.

Judge

)f the Third District Court correctly ruled that
f.'r"Jant
t 1,'"

:,J•! i 3

Lnn

\dS

not a BFP under Louisiana Law.

The purpose of

unoi Vehicle Certificate of Title Law is to "protect
purchasers who have relied thereon."

:·1cBr•1u•', 275 So.

Ball:1rd v.

2d 464, 467 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1973).

Under

Loui31ana Law, a purchaser is bound to check the records to
determine who holds title and whether any liens are
Jutstanding.

Kaplan v. Associates Discount Corp., 253 La. 137,

217 s''· 2d 177 (1968); Ballard v. McBryde, 275 so. 2d 464 (La.
App.

l973).

Defendant failed to check the public records to

decermine if any liens existed on the Ferrari until several
montns after he took possession.

Further, as the bank retained

title to the car at all times, its security interest was
maintained under Louisiana Law.

Commercial National Bank of

Shrevepc·rt v. Mcwilliams, 606 S.W. 2d 363 (Ark. 1980) (Applying
Louisiana Law).

Defendant was not a bona fide purchaser under

Louisiana Law, nor is defendant a bona fide purchaser under
Utah Law.
The Utan court defines a bona fide purchaser is a person
pays value and takes "without actual or constructive
'r,,\,[<ed(1.o

:.f Licts sufficient to put him on notice of the

:)mplainant's equity."
'Jtan,

Blodgett v. Martsch, 590 P.2d 298

The facts befor<:> this Court do not support

19?G)

contention that he is a bona fide purchaser for the
1 1 ,w 1 n q

3.

s •_Jn s:
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l.

Defendant nad C',>nstructive n.,t1ce ,,f Plaintiff Pank •,

lien on the car before he paid any considerati:.n for the
automobile.

Both the original Certificate :.f Title showing

Ricnard Carey as owner and the later Certificate of Title
showing Mr. Amann as owner ,_:;f the Ferrari w:.ted Plaintiff Banf
as the lienholder on the car.
It is immaterial, so far as Defendant's bona fide purchase·
status is concerned, which of the two was in ef feet at the
Defendant took possession of the car.

In either case, the

Defendant had constructive notice of Plaintiff's lien.
Defendant checked the Louisiana
admits he didn't do

Had

Vehicle records, wnich ,,,

(R. 291; deposition ,of Meacham p. 21) he

would have been fully aware of the Banks lien.

"Notice" to

defeat BFP status may be either actual or constructive; the
"actual knowledge" provision of section 70A-l-2Cl of the Utan
Code Annotated argued by appellant, does n.;t apply to bona fie'
purchasers.
2.

Defendant had actual knowledge of the lien before

making payment on the Automobile.

Defendant states in his

deposition that in July, 1981, he was contacted by both
and the Bank regarding the disp'.:lsition of the aut·omobi le and
tnat time learned of Bank's lien on the aut>mobile.
neg,_, ti at in g wit n the Bank ,

i·

After

each am agreed t n at h" w,:. u 1d pa Y '' '.

the Bank's Lien and receive clear titlP to •he car.
deposition of Meacham, pp. 27-30)
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Pur su::i.nt

t·.-)

these

( R.

291;

,,rea

20,

1981, to facilitate Meacham's payment of the

'"''' and sent it co Defendant's bank.
1,i1

(R. 98)

Obviously,

was aware of the Bank's lien prior to July 20, 1981.
did not pay any value for the Ferrari until July 20,

:'

wnen he wired his one he and only payment of $5,000 to
'Dr,

Amann" ,,n July 20, 1981.

There is no question but that

was aware of the lien on the Ferrari before he
purcnased it.
3.

Defendant claims to have purchased the automobile from

R1cnard Carey, yet he made his payment to Dr. Amann.

(R.

71)

Defendant was therefore put on inquiry notice as to the actual
interests of Dr. Amann and Carey in the automobile.

As a

result, Defendant was put on inquiry notice as to whether Carey
actually owned the car.
11e=ich01m received inquiry notice, constructive notice 01nd
notice of the B01nk's lien before purchasing the
auturnob1le; failed to check the public records and never
obtained possession of the title to the vehicle.

He cannot

poss1nly be a bona fide purchaser.

CONCLUSION
Hunorable Philip Fishler correctly found Defendant
!leacham t,, be guilty of conversion.

The Bank was entitled to

c,1rned1ate possession "'f the automobile upon Amann's default
,,fl'"r w111cn Defendant Meacham took possession of the vehicle
>1•1nsl tne interest of Plaintiff Bank.
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Contrary to the dicta

in Judge Fishler's decision the Bank did PVerything necessary
to perfect its se2urity interest in the automobile.

And even

if the interest was unperfected, Defendant Meacham had inquir
constructive, and actual notice of Plaintiff's lien before
paying any value for the car, and never obtained possession
the title to the Ferrari.

0f

Defendant, therefore, cannot be a

BFP under the laws of Louisiana or Utah and Plaintiff's rights
in the automobile are therefore superior to Defendant's.
As the Honorable Judge Philip Fishier did not err in
granting Plaintiff's Motion for summary Judgment, the judgment
should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted this

;z /day

of November, 1983.

ame L. Chr ioo _nsen
NIELSEN & SENIO
1100 Beneficial Life Tower
36 south State Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorneys for P laintiff-Respcr.
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1 hereby certify that I

served the foregoing Brief of

by mailing a copy thereof, postage prepaid, to
Lester A. Perry, GREGORY S. BELL & ASSOCIATES, attorneys for
Appellant,
84111, this

376 East 400 South, Suite 210, Salt Lake City, Utah

;z,/

day of November, 1983.
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